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Abstract – Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a
branch of Cryptography that can be used for encrypt-
ing data, generating digital signatures or exchanging
keying material during the initial phases of a secure
communication. Regarding encryption, the best-known
scheme based on ECC is the Elliptic Curve Integrated
Encryption Scheme (ECIES). A Java implementation
of ECIES is presented in this paper, showing all the
options associated to the encryption scheme that can
be configured by the user.
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1. Introduction
Since the development of public key cryptography
by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 ([7]), several cryptosys-
tems have been published. In particular, Miller ([14])
and Koblitz ([11]) proposed in 1985 a cryptosystem
whose security relies on the Elliptic Curve Discrete
Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). So far, no algorithm is
known that solves the ECDLP in an efficient way,
and some authors consider ([6] and [11]) that this
mathematical problem is even more difficult to solve
than other mathematical problems (e.g. the Integer Fac-
torization Problem or the Discrete Logarithm Problem)
which are used in other cryptosystems. This is the
reason why the key length in ECC is significantly
smaller than in other cryptosystems as RSA, as it can
be observed in Figure 1, which presents a comparison
of key lengths associated to the same cryptographic
strength for RSA and ECC ([8] and [15]), where the
cryptographic strength is interpreted as the security
level provided by a symmetric encryption algorithm
using a key of n bits.
Figure 1. Key length comparison
An elliptic curve E over the finite field (or Galois
Field) F is defined by the following equation, known
as the Weierstrass equation ([16]):
E : y2 +a1 xy+a3 y = x3 +a2 x2 +a4 x+a6, (1)
where a1,a2,a3,a4,a6 ∈ F and ∆ 6= 0, being ∆ the
discriminant of the curve E. Condition ∆ 6= 0 assures
that the curve is smooth, i.e., there are no curve points
with two or more different tangent lines. In practice,
instead of the Weierstrass equation, simplified versions
depending on the characteristic of the finite field F are
used. When the characteristic of the field F is a prime
number, p, other than 2 or 3, the finite field (which is
represented as GF(p) or Fp) is said to be a prime finite
field ([13]). If this is the case, the simplified equation
is
y2 = x3 +ax+b. (2)
If the characteristic of the finite field F is 2, then the
finite field (represented as GF(2m) or F2m ) is a binary
finite field. The resulting equation in this case is
y2 + xy = x3 +ax2 +b. (3)
ECIES is an integrated encryption scheme based
on elliptic curves that includes public key operations,
encryption algorithms, authentication codes and hash
computations. More precisely, ECIES is the generic
term used to identify a set of slightly different encryp-
tion schemes based on the papers of Mihir Bellare,
Philip Rogaway, and Michel Abdalla ([1] and [2]), who
developed the encryption scheme DHIES (Diffie Hell-
man Integrated Encryption Scheme) which represents
the kernel of ECIES. For the sake of simplicity, we will
refer to those implementations derived from DHIES
using the term ECIES for all of them.
Over the years, ECIES has been included in several
standards, and currently it can be found in the docu-
ments ANSI X9.63 ([4]), IEEE 1363a ([9]), ISO/IEC
18033-2 ([10]), and in some deliverables (e.g., [17] and
[19]) from the Standards for Efficient Cryptography
Group (SECG).
Figure 2 presents a graphic description of the ECIES
encryption process, including the elements and func-
tions involved in the procedure. The steps that must
be taken in order to complete the encryption of a clear
message are:
1) The sender must create a pair of temporary keys.
The temporary private key will be denoted as u,
and the temporary public key as U .
2) The sender will use the key agreement function,
KA, in order to create a shared secret value,
which is the product of the sender’s temporary
private key and the recipient’s public key, V .
3) The sender will take the shared secret value (and
optionally other parameters) as input data for the
key derivation function, denoted as KDF. The
output of this function is the concatenation of the
encryption key, kENC, and the MAC key, kMAC.
4) The sender will encrypt the clear message, m,
using the ENC symmetric algorithm and the
encryption key kENC. The encrypted message
will be represented as c.
5) Taking the encrypted message and the MAC
key (and optionally other parameters), the sender
will use the selected MAC function in order to
produce a tag.
6) Finally, the sender will take the temporary public
key, the encrypted message and the tag, and will
send the cryptogram consisting of those three
concatenated elements, U ||c||tag, to the recipient
of the message.
To the extent of our knowledge, there is no ECIES
software implementation that offers the possibility to
set up all the different options and functionalities that
must be selected by the user following the recommen-
dations of the most relevant standards. In this paper,
we present a Java ECIES implementation where the
number of combinations of parameters and functions
is certainly high, with the aim to test this encryption
scheme and be able to try the different combinations
that could be relevant in different deployments.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following
way: In Section 2 we present a Java implementation
of ECIES developed for PC platforms, the security of
ECIES is commented in Section 3, an example of this
implementation is included in Section 4 and, finally,
Section 5 contains our conclusions.
2. A Java PC implementation of ECIES
The ECIES implementation presented in this contri-
bution is composed of a menu bar and four panels, as
it can be seen in Figure 3. The menu bar includes the
following items:
• Program: The options belonging to this menu
entry are Look & Field (which allows the user to
select either the Nimbus or the Windows graphical
themes), Help (an HTML file with a comprehen-
sive description of the program), About (basic
information about the software version and the
authors), and Exit.
• Mode: This menu option allows the user to choose
among the Standard and the Advanced items that
represent a different display view. In the Standard
view, the Configuration panel and the Profiles
and Test menu options are hidden, as in this
view a fixed set of parameters for the encryption
and decryption processes is used, whereas in the
Advanced view those panels and menu options are
available to the user.
• Profiles: This option includes frequently used sets
of parameters (e.g. ISO/IEC and SECG typical
configurations).
• Test: The selection of one of the options that
belong to this menu entry loads a fixed set of
parameters and information corresponding to sev-
Figure 2. ECIES functional diagram.
Figure 3. Menu bar and panels of the ECIES software.
eral test cases included in ISO/IEC 18033-2 ([10])
and SECG GEC 2 ([17]).
• Curves: By means of this option, the user can load
the parameters of several elliptic curves defined
over Fp or F2m . These curves have been proposed
and published by ANSI ([3]), Brainpool ([5]),
NIST ([15]) and SECG ([18]).
• Tools: In this menu entry several tools are in-
cluded, where the most important one is the gen-
erator of key pairs that are stored by the program
with a proper format as local files.
• Field: This menu element allows to work with ei-
ther the finite field Fp or F2m , using the switching
option GF(p)/GF(2ˆm).
The four panels (Configuration, Parameters, En-
cryption, and Decryption) are described in detail in
the next sections.
2.1. Configuration panel
Figure 4 presents the elements of this panel. The list
of options available in this version of the software for
each element is the following:
• Hash function: SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and
SHA-512.
• KDF function: KDF1 and ANSI.
• MAC function: HMAC-SHA-1-160, HMAC-
SHA-256-256, HMAC-SHA-384-384, and
HMAC-SHA-512-512.
• Encryption function: XOR, AES in CBC and ECB
modes, both with PKCS#5 padding, and 3DES
in CBC mode with either PKCS#5 padding or
without padding.
• MAC key length in bytes.
• Encryption key length in bytes.
• Option to include the temporary public key of the
sender as an input to the KDF function.
• Selection of the first coordinate of the shared
secret or its SHA-1 hash value as an input to the
Figure 4. Configuration panel.
KDF function.
• Interpretation of the KDF function output, which
can be either kMAC||kENC or kENC||kMAC.
• Binary representation of the elliptic curve points
(compressed or uncompressed).
2.2. Parameters panel
The Parameters panel includes the values related to
the elliptic curve that must be initialized in order to be
able to perform the encryption/decryption procedure.
Depending on the type of finite field selected, this
panel presents a different set of parameters. If the
option GF(p) is selected (i.e. the user decides to work
with prime finite fields), the elements that are included
in the panel represented by the left image in Figure 5
are the following:
• p: Prime number characterizing the finite field
Fp = {0,1,2, . . . , p−1}.
• a, b: Elements of the field Fp that define the
elliptic curve whose equation is given by (2).
• Gx, Gy: Coordinates of G, which is the point
of the curve that will be used as a generator
of the points representing public keys, where
G = (Gx,Gy) and Gx,Gy ∈ Fp.
• n: Prime number whose value represents the order
of the point G.
• h: Cofactor of the curve which is computed as
h = #E(Fp)/n.
• u, v: Sender’s temporary private key and receiver’s
permanent private key, respectively, with u,v∈Fp.
• Ux, Uy: Coordinates of the sender’s temporary
public key, where U = (Ux,Uy) and Ux,Uy ∈ Fp.
• Vx, Vy: Coordinates of the receiver’s permanent
public key, where V = (Vx,Vy) and Vx,Vy ∈ Fp.
If the selected option is GF(2ˆm), then the elements
included in the panel (and shown in the right image in
Figure 5) are:
• m: Exponent that characterizes the finite field F2m .
• k1, k2, k3: Exponents of the irreducible polyno-
mial f (x) = xm + xk3 + xk2 + xk1 + 1 used in the
operations with polynomial basis.
• a, b: Elements of the field F2m that define the
elliptic curve specified by equation (3).
• Gx, Gy: Coordinates of the generator G, where
Gx,Gy ∈ F2m .
• n: Order of the point G.
• h: Cofactor of the curve.
• u, v: Sender’s temporary private key and receiver’s
permanent private key, where u,v ∈ F2m .
• Ux, Uy: Coordinates of the sender’s temporary
public key, where Ux,Uy ∈ F2m .
• Vx, Vy: Coordinates of the receiver’s permanent
public key, where Vx,Vy ∈ F2m .
Independently of the considered finite field, this
panel includes the following elements:
• Format: Option to present the data strings in either
hexadecimal or decimal format.
• Information: Output of the process.
• Generate: Button that allows the user to compute
the coordinates of both points U and V using the
generator and the values u and v.
• Delete: Button for erasing the information of this
panel.
Figure 5. Parameters panel.
2.3. Encryption panel
The Encryption panel (left image in Figure 6) in-
cludes the following elements needed to compute the
cryptogram corresponding to a given message:
• Target public key: Receiver’s permanent public
key. If the user clicks on the Text option, the
Parameters panel will be activated so the user can
enter the recipient’s public key data. On the other
hand, if the user clicks on the File option, the
user will be prompted to select the file storing the
certificate that contains the public key.
• Plaintext: Message that the sender wants to trans-
mit to the receiver. The message can be entered
either manually or uploaded from a file. Once the
message is typed or uploaded, it is shown in the
corresponding window.
• Tag input: Additional data that is optionally used
as input in the MAC function.
• Cryptogram: Output of the encryption process,
consisting of the concatenation U ||c||tag, where
U is the sender’s temporary public key, c is the
message encrypted with the chosen symmetric
encryption algorithm, and tag is the output of the
MAC function.
• Information: Data referred to the output of the
encryption process.
The information related to the plaintext and the tag
can be displayed (in their respective text boxes) either
as regular ASCII text or in hexadecimal format. In
comparison, the format options related to the cryp-
togram are Base64 and hexadecimal.
2.4. Decryption panel
The Decryption panel (right image in Figure 6) in-
cludes the following elements needed for the recovery
of a plaintext from a cryptogram:
• Target’s private key: Receiver’s permanent private
key. If the user clicks on the Text option, the
Parameters panel will be activated so the user can
enter manually his private key data. Besides, if
the user clicks on the File option, the private key
information will be recovered from a file.
• Cryptogram: Data received from the sender, rep-
resenting the concatenation of elements U ||c||tag.
• Plaintext: Original message that the sender tries
to transmit to the receiver.
• Tag: Optional data that is used as input in the
MAC function.
• Information: Data referred to the output of the
decryption process.
The data presented in the text boxes related to the
plaintext and the tag can be displayed either as regular
Figure 6. Encryption and decryption panels.
ASCII text or in hexadecimal format, while the display
options for to the cryptogram text box are Base64 and
hexadecimal.
3. Attacks and security recommendations
As described in [12], the known attacks on ECIES
can be classified as follows:
• Benign and malign malleability attacks.
• Small subgroup attacks.
• Subexponential attacks with supersingular and
anomalous curves.
Besides, when implementing ECIES, it is necessary
to consider the security implications of decisions such
as the usage of the compressed format, the keying
material interpretation, the type and number of the
optional parameters fed to the KDF and MAC func-
tions, the dynamic selection of parameters for the same
public key, etc.
Accordingly to [12], the configuration (functions and
parameters) of ECIES used in the example described
in Section 4 ensures that no currently known attack
can be performed on this implementation of ECIES.
4. Example
Figure 6 provides an encryption and decryption ex-
ample, where the relevant elements for both processes
are the following:
• Target’s public key (in encryption): Retrieved
from the file SECG 160 Fp.pub.
• Plaintext (in encryption): Obtained from the file
Treasure Island intro.txt, whose con-
tent can be seen in the plaintext text box of the
left image in ASCII format.
• Tag input (both in decryption and decryption):
Text consisting in the sentence “Beginning of
Chapter 1”, represented as ASCII text in the left
image and in hexadecimal format in the right
image of the Figure 6.
• Cryptogram (in encryption): File where the out-
put of the encryption process is stored. In
this case, the file is Encrypted Treasure
Island.bin, and the content can be seen in the
cryptogram text box of the left image in Base64
format.
• Target’s private key (in decryption): Uploaded
from the file SECG 160 Fp.pri.
• Cryptogram (in decryption): Obtained from the
file Encrypted Treasure Island.bin,
whose content can be seen in the cryptogram text
box of the right image in hexadecimal format.
• Plaintext (in decryption): File where the output
of the decryption process is stored. In this case,
the file name is Clear intro.txt, and the
content can be seen is the plaintext box of the
right image in hexadecimal format.
The combination of parameters used in this en-
cryption/decryption process (hash function, etc.) is
presented in Figure 4. The public and private keys
(defined in the example over a prime field Fp), and
the rest of data elements related to the elliptic curve
that are necessary in the computations, are shown in
the left image of Figure 5.
5. Conclusions
As we have commented during this contribution,
ECIES is an encryption scheme whose implementation
details vary depending on the standard where it is
included. The nature and number of differences prevent
a developer from building a software implementation
compatible with all the relevant security standards,
so the designer must take some decisions based on
the availability and efficiency of the specific functions
included in the target platform.
We have developed a Java encryption software that
can be used to test different parameter combinations
and decide which is the best one in a particular
deployment scenario of the ECIES encryption scheme.
Performance tests can be conducted by any third party
using this tool in order to determine the proper finite
field, key length, KDF function, etc.
Additionally, our ECIES software can be used to
check that a certain implementation adjusts to one or
several of the standards mentioned in this contribution.
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